ETHICAL AND LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON
CONTRACT AND CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
JosEPH LAUER*

In response to profound social, economic and technological changes experimentation with new forms' of medical practice has begun on a nationwide basis. These
new forms might be described as deviations from a traditional pattern which was
molded by a close, confidential relationship between doctor and patient, entered into
and continued by virtue of a "free choice" on both sides, and based economically upon
a fee charged for an individual service. Where the patient is met no longer by an
individual physician but by a group, usually specialists united in a "clinic," the first
deviation from the pattern is present: i.e., "group practice." Here the economic basis
of the relationship is'still the individual fee. A second deviation, often combined with,
but distinguishable from, the first, is the intervention of a third party, an individual
or organization agreeing with a physician or a group of physicians for the future
treatment of a group of patients. The patient no longer contracts directly with the
physician. Practice carried on pursuant to such third-party agreements is termed
"contract practice' 2 by the medical profession. It is these agreements which form the
basis of most medical care plans providing for risk-sharing prepayment by groups of
patients.
These plans utilizing either "group" or "contract" practice or both, must run the
gantlet of restrictive rules derived from medical ethics or law. Of the major restrictions two will be considered here: the ethical rules governing "contract practice," and
the legal rules governing "corporate practice of medicine."
The ethical and the legal rules alike spring from a time when the traditional
pattern was the universal ideal. Their main purposes were to protect the public from
quackery and also to preserve the traditional detachment of the profession from commercialism. The danger of lay and even professional efforts to import commercial
methods into the medical field has been a real one in the past, and it would be idld to
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assume that the risk no longer exists. Now, as then, the ethical rules and the medical
practice acts fulfill an important task in thwarting such anti-social efforts. But the
problem today is more difficult. The courts, in interpreting the medical practice acts

face a dilemma: too restrictive an interpretation may block socially desirable experimentation, too liberal rulings may open the door to commercialized schemes. It is
important, therefore, in this period of transition, to examine the legal principles involved, and the bases for their interpretation. The same, mutatis mutandis, holds true
of the professional ethics of the medical profession. The latter are embodied in the
code of ethics of the American Medical Association and constitute the special law of
a group, made, interpreted, enforced by the group or its subdivisions. The code was
adopted 4 in its present form in I9I2 by the AMA's legislature, the House of Delegates,

and entitled "Principles of Ethics." It is applied and interpreted in the grievance
committees of the component county and constituent state societies. From these committees, which are, in effect, professional courts, appeal lies to the Judicial Council

of the AMA, the medical Supreme Court. That rulings and decisions of these professional courts do not lack effective sanction is evident from the fact that the ultimate
penalty, expulsion 5 from his professional organization, may often spell economic
ruin to the expelled member, for he may no longer be able to treat his patients in
good hospitals.
Seldom have courts interfered with this professional jurisdiction if the defendant
has been accorded a fair hearing. This non-interference is based on the notion that
private organizations, as the AMA, may lay down rules" which must be followed by
those who wish to be or remain members. The only limitation on this group
autonomy is that the rules may not run counter to "public policy" as conceived by
the reviewing court.7 But these prof6sional rules have a wider importance. They
have often a decisive bearing on judicial decisions. Legal reasoning is seldom, if ever,
self-sufficient or self-sustaining. It draws its driving force and persuasion from other
and deeper sources, and one of these is ethics. Thus, in the litigation of questions
involving the practice of medicine the ethical rules may often be more decisive than
mere logical, legal argumentation. It is against this backdrop of judicial and professional power and responsibility that the following discussion should be viewed.
ETHICAL REsTRAINTs ON CONTRACT PRACTICE

The history of contract practice 8 can be traced back over a period of almost 90
years. It originated as early as the middle of the last century when railroads, mining
'See MEDIcAL CARE FOR THE AmmRICAN PEOPLE, supra note I, at 47(9x2) 58 J. A. M. A. 1907.
'See cases of recent expulsions cited in Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1193, n. 14.

Cf. Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Med. Society, 277 N. W. 378 (Neb. 1938); Harris v. Thomas,
217 S. W. xo68 (Tex. App. 1g2o). As to rules on contract practice, see Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1o9o, 126

So. 669 (1930); Porter v. King County Med. Society, 186 Wash. 410, 58 P. (2d) 367 (1936).
'See cases cited supra, note 6.
'See, generally, LELAND, SomE P SEs oF CoNTRACT PRACTICE, (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ., 1932);
LELAND, Contract Practice, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONGRESS OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, HOSPITALS
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and lumbering industries met the need of providing medical care for their employees

under "frontier" conditions by hiring salaried physicians. The practice spread. When
in the beginning of this century workmen's compensation laws began to be enacted,
some states built the existing pattern of this industrial contract practice into their own
scheme of reform, giving it not only formal legal sanction but new impetus. The
tendency towards expansion was further strengthened by the steady growth of industrialization. Another, independent root is found in mutual benefit associations in the
cities which furnished their members hospitalization and medical care for which they
paid in form'of membership fees.
From the very outset, the medical profession raised grave ethical objections against
this method of supplying medical care, especially within the industrial field where
the danger of abuses was greatest. Underpayment of the contract physician, restriction of free choice, insufficient treatment, lay control, interference with the confidential doctor-patient relationship, underbidding between physicians and generally
unfair competition with the independent practitioner were mainly complained of.
Intimations9 were made that contract practice was justifiable only in cases of
necessity, i.e., where- independent practitioners are not available. The enactment of
the workmen's compensation laws did not silence these complaints since they did
not prevent the continuance of some of these abuses in this field into the present
time as a recent comprehensive study indicates.' 0
Despite the abuses, actual or possible, connected with contract practice, it spread
far beyond the industrial field with its special problems. Prior to 1912, however, the
code of ethics had not dealt specifically with it. Whatever objections were raised at
that time, were based on more general principles. But when in 1912 the present
version of the "Principles of Ethics" was adopted, 1 a new section 12 was inserted
under the heading of "Contract Practice" which provided:
"It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions that
make it impossible to render adequate service to his patients or which interfere with reasonable competition among the physicians of a community. To do this is detrimental to
the public and to the individual physician, and lowers the dignity of the profession."
This rule remained unchanged until 1934. The emphasis upon two major objections, danger of inadequate service and of unreasonable competition among physicians, illustrates clearly the dual aspect of the problem in which ethical and economic
considerations are interwoven. But the question was not settled by this broad rule.
Contract practice continued to expand. In 1939, the AMA's authority on contract
practice reported' 3 that there are:
"75 group hospitalization plans, some 54 hospital insurance companies, . . . at least 2000
medical care services, at least 500 medical and hospital benefit organizations, about 24
AND LICENSURE OF THE AMA, 1937, 75, 82 (hereafter cited as "Proceedings"); EcoNoMICs AND THE ETwics
OF MEDICINE (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ., 1937).
'Cf. LELAND, CONTRACT PRACTICE (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ. 1932) 17.
'ODODD, ADMINISTRATION OF VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (936) 490-493.
12
11
Supra note 2.
Supra note 4.

a Leland, Trends in the Distribution of Medical Care, PROCEEDINGS, 1939, 71.
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union sick benefit funds and fraternal organizations,... about 300 private group clinics, at
least 300 college and university students health services, ... an unknown number of plans
designed to assist portions of low income farm families ...;in addition, the physicians
themselves are operating more than 150 medical care plans and are considering the organization of 12o more...."
This growth of contract practice was accompanied within the profession by discussion and dissension mounting with the stress of the depression years. The Judicial
Council had occasion to warn1 4 that "many of the members of the AMA are straining
at the ethical leashes which curb their desires." Finally, the need for further development of the rule led to a number of amendments adopted in 1934.
One of them, though general in form, has a direct bearing on contract practice. It
provides, under the title "Direct Profits to Lay Groups": 1 5
"It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional attainments or services
to any lay body, organization, group or individual, by whatever name called, or however
organized, under terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary
or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual employing him. Such a
procedure is beneath the dignity of professional practice, is unfair competition with the
profession at large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of the
people, and is against sound public policy."
This section, aimed against commercial exploitation of medical services, would
clearly not prevent non-profit organizations from engaging in contract practice even
if they should accumulate an operating surplus which would be used as a reserve.
More pertinent to the speific problem, however, is another amendment' 6 which
provided:
"By the term 'contract practice' as applied to medicine is meant the carrying out of an
agreement between a physician or a group of physicians, as principals or agents, and a
corporation, organization, political subdivisioft or individual, to furnish partial or full
medical services to a group or class of individuals on the basis of a fee schedule or for a
salary or a fixed rate per capita.
"Contract practice per se is not unethical. However, certain features or conditions if present
make a contract unethical, among which are: i. When there is solicitation of patients,
directly or indirectly. 2. When there is underbidding to secure the contract. 3-When the
compensation is inadequate to assure good medical service. 4. When there is interference
with reasonable competition in a community. 5. When free choice of a physician is prevented. 6. When the conditions of employment make it impossible to render adequate
service to the patients. 7. When the contract because of any of its provisions or practical
results is contrary to sound public policy.
"Each contract should be considered on its own merits and in the light of surrounding
conditions. Judgment should not be obscured by immediate, temporary or local results.
The decision as to its ethical or unethical nature must be based on the ultimate effect for
good or ill on the people as a whole."
This amendment' removes any doubt that hitherto may have existed as to the
ethical status of contract practice generally. It is now impossible to deny ethical
a,Report of the Judicial Council (x934) io2 J. A. M. A. 1497.
Now c. III, art. VI, §5, supra note 2.

"oNow c. HII,art. VI, §3, supra note 2.
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recognition to an agreement simply because it involves contract practice. To that
extent the provision restricts complementary rules'T which component and constituent societies might adopt. Since they may not contradict the rules of the AMA,
any blanket provisionl8 against contract practice would be unconstitutional and void.
It is likewise to be noted that contract practice has not been restricted to "emergency"
situations where the "usual conditions of employment," i.e., an individual doctorpatient agreement, cannot be created.
This shift in position-essentially a change in emphasis--suggests a need to
resolve a conflict of ethical ideals or values. The ideal of the individual doctor-patient
relationship conflicted with the ideal of extending medical care to all in so far as that
could be achieved only by contract practice. It is a familiar function of ethical rules
to guide choice where a dilemma is unavoidable. They fix a scale or hierarchy of
values which changes with changing times and circumstances. Thus, precedence is
now accorded the extension of medical care through contract practice but only if
certain basic conditions, associated with the individual relationship ideal, are complied with. It must be noted, however, that this enumeration of "features or conditions" which taint an agreement as unethical, is not exclusive. Some are of a kind
determinable by facts which are more or less easily ascertainable or measurable.
Solicitation, underbidding, inadequate compensation, perhaps even presence or absence of free choice of physician are among them. But others are far less tangible.
When is there "interference with reasonable competition in a community"? What
are the standards of reasonable competition? When, furthermore, is a contract
contrary to sound public policy? May that be the case even if all the preceding
objectionable features have been eliminated? The code gives' 9 a general hint: "each
contract should be considered on its own merits and in the light of surrounding
conditions. Judgment should not be obscured by immediate, temporary or local
results. The decision as to its ethical or unethical nature must be based on the ultimate effect for good or ill on the people as a whole." This caveat raises the question
Whether final effects can be determined other than in terms of local results which,
as the "Principles" warn, should be disregarded as "obscuring the judgment."
In 1937 a further amendment 2" was added. It provided:
The phrase "free choice of physician" as applied to contract practice is defined to mean
that degree of freedom in choosing a physician which can be exercised under usual conditions of employment between patient and physician when no third party has a valid
interest or intervenes. The interjection of a third party who has a valid interest or who
intervenes does not per se cause a contract to be unethical. A "valid interest" is ond where,
by law or necessity, a third party is legally responsible either for cost of care or for indemnity. "Intervention" is the voluntary assumption of partial or full responsibility for
medical care. Intervention shall not proscribe endeavor by component or constituent medical societies to maintain high quality of service rendered by members serving under
Cf. warning in the Report of the Judicial Council (1937) io8 J. A. M. A. 1539.
But cf. Ill. State Med. Society ruling that lodge contract practice is unethical, (x937) to9 J. A. M. A.,
Organizational Section, 84 b.
i
19 Supra note x6.
20 Now c. III, art. VI, §3, su ra note 2.
"
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approved sickness service agreements between such societies and governmental boards or
bureaus and approved by the respective societies.
The provision, rather obscurely phrased, 2 1 seems to indicate that the ideal of freedom
of choice has been abandoned in a case where "a third party has a valid interest or
intervenes. '22 The third party thus privileged must have either of the following
qualifications (i) it must be legally responsible for the patient, or (2) it must have

agreed to a voluntary assumption of partial or full financial responsibility. But when
may a party, by law or necessity, be legally responsible? It can obviously not mean
when a party has bound itself by contract. For this would permit restriction of "freedom of choice" in all cases of contract practice and thus render the entire provision
nugatory. The elimination of that responsibility based on contract would leave governmental departments, subdivisions of the states, perhaps employers under the
workmen's compensation laws, as such privileged parties for their responsibility rests
directly on law. This answer does not cover the case*where a party is legally responsible "by necessity." Presumably, the phrase aims at a situation where a legal
duty to give medical care arises only if the patient cannot get it otherwise, as, e.g., the
lumbering company might be responsible for a woodsman sent to a remote lumber
camp.

When is there a "voluntary" assumption of financial responsibility? Again, it
cannot mean a party that is not obligated to assume financial responsibility but assumes it of its own accord, for this interpretation would permit all contract schemes
of private organizations to restrict "freedom of choice" which cannot, be intended.
The term "voluntary" would rather point to charitable institutions which render their
services gratuitously. This interpretation accords with current usage of the term by
the medical profession.
If this interpretation is correct, the amendment relaxed the rules as to "freedom
of choice" somnewhat in favor of governmental and charitable contracts, probably also
in the situations covered by the workmen's compensation acts. It has tightened
them, however, in all other agreements, by requiring practically absolute freedom of
choice. It is very doubtful whether many of the plans actually operating comply
with this strict requirement. It must be further noted that even in plans where this
freedom is absolute, the very existence of the plans leads to an important quflification: under many plans, the patient may, for'purposes of control, be brought in contact with a supervising physician. This is especially true when serious and costly
operations are contemplated. If plans, based on private initiative, are to succeed there
may be need for some form of approach to the public. Dignified solicitation 23 may
"No official comment was published at the time of adoption. See (x937) io8 J. A. M. A. 2225.
" The statement that the "interjection of the third party" does not per se make a contract unethical,
would be a needless repetition of the general principle that contract practice is not unethical per se unless
it means that in these cases even the absence of free choice will not render the contract unethical per se.
"s Cf. PRINCIPLES OP MEDICAL ETmCS, c. III, art. 1, §4: "Solicitation of patients by physicians as individuals, or collectively by groups by whatsoever name these be called, or by institutions or organizations,
whether by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications, is unprofessional. This does not
prohibit ethical institutions from a legitimate advertisement of location, physical surroundings, and special
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have to be recognized within clearly defined limits. These illustrations show that the
recognition of contract practice will raise new and difficult ethical problems.
The present rules are doubtless not the ultimate answer. As they stand, it must
be admitted that the grant of discretion to the grievance committees is, for purposes
of administration, unlimited. The final control over any agreement seems to be left
with the local committees or state appeal boards which may or may not seek
advice of -the Judicial Council. Formal appeals to this body, as contrasted with
informal inquiries and replies, seem to be rare. The comparative lack of publicity
given to these "internal affairs" prevent ascertainment of the application of the rules
on "contract practice" to individual cases. Litigation over these matters in ordinary
courts is uncommon and as long as the courts feel that these rules are not violating
"public policy," litigation would seem useless.
LEGAL RESTiTIS ON THE "CoRPORATE PRACTICE" OF MEWCIN

The corporate device 24 is frequently encountered in the sphere of medical activities.
Proprietary, charitable and university hospitals, where patients are treated by salaried
physicians, have long been familiar. With the spread of industrial contract practice,
hospitals were built by physicians engaged therein, and organized as corporations.
Large industrial corporations, railroads, etc., set up their own hospitals, and engaged
medical staffs for their employees. More recently, the device has been used for purposes of organizing group practice in the form of incorporated clinics requiring
capital investment by the associated doctors. These "plant" investments have increased with the ever-growing need for complicated, expensive equipment. In addition, expected or actual advantages under the tax laws, convenience of transfer in the
case of personnel changes, avoidance of risk of liability for malpractice incurred by
colleagues, continuity of the corporate existence, all such considerations may have
contributed to the choice of this form so familiar to the business world.2 5
Many of these "clinics" dealt with the individual patient as would an individual
practitioner. Some however, engaged in either industrial or general contract practice.
Laymen organized corporations for profit which sold medical service contracts to the
public. The services were to be supplied by doctors who had contracted with the
corporation. On a higher plane, insurance companies began to write health policies
providing either for the payment of a doctor's bill or the supply of medical services
in kind. To the familiar incorporated fraternal or mutual benefit organizations,
which included medical services among their benefits, have recently been added non-'
profit cooperatives organized by lay groups for the specific purpose of supplying their
members with medical care on a prepayment basis.
class-if any-of patients accommodated." See also proposal to permit advertising of plans sponsored by
state societies (1938) III J. A. M. A. 1210, 1215.
" See, generally, i FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) §97, 6 id. §2525; Davis, Do Corporations
Practice Medicine? PROCEEDINGS 1932, 88 et seq.; Warnshuis, The Practice of Medicine by Corporations
PROCEEDINGS 1932, 72; Levy and Mermin, Cooperative Medicine and the Law (1938) 1 NAT. LAWYERS
GUILD Q. 194; Note, Right of Corporationto PracticeMedicine (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 346; Notes (1939) 7
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 120; (1939) 37 MICH. L. REv. 961; (I939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 183.
"' PRIVATE GROUP CLINICS: COMM. ON COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, Pub. No. 8 (1931) 19, 20.
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Despite this widespread use of the corporate device its legal status is by no means
clear. The corporation statutes which usually, provide that a corporation may be
formed for any "lawful" purpose do not give an explicit answer since they throw no
light on the "lawfulness" of the purpose. The legality of the purpose must depend on
the applicability of the medical licensure acts. A literal reading of their provisions 28
indicates that they were aimed to regulate only the conduct of individuals engaging.in
medical activity. As they do not say explicitly what shall be the effect of the employment of such an individual by a corporation, there results a "gap" in the law which
must be dosed, in the absence of specific legislative regulation, by judicial interpretation. In other words, the problem is reduced to one of public policy to be determined
by the courts.
Any examination of this policy problem calls for inquiry into the considerations
governing the regulation of the professions. Basic among these is the grave difficulty
raised by the professional man's tremendous power over the lay client. In ordinary
dealings, the layman's common sense and experience suffice to check undue encroachments on his interests by the other side. This check is absent when he deals with
professional men to whom, often enough, his health or economic existence must be
entrusted; whatever the layman's experience may be, the lawyer's or physician's conduct is, to a large extent, beyond the reach of his judgment. Here, the "policing"
function of the licensure statutes fulfils an important task. Unfit practitioners are
kept out and those who are admitted are subjected to legal supervision, supplemented
by professional discipline. Why then should the appearance of a corporation in the
professional field create difficulty, provided only duly licensed physicians or lawyers
are entitled to act as its agents? They will be subjected to the double supervision
exercised over the independent professional man: by state authorities under the
licensure acts, by professional bodies under the ethical odes. However, this reasoning overlooks one fact: both licensure states as well as enforceable rules of ethics
reach or "police" only the most egregious offenses committed in the wide area of
professional activities. The remainder is and must be left to the conscience of the
individual. As he faces the ever-present temptation of furthering, without risk of
discovery or punishment, his own interests over those of an unwitting client, ethical
rules are expected to check his desires. Experience has shown that this check may
prove too weak, but its necessity and average efficacy cannot be doubted. It is here
that the appearance of the corporation raises a real problem. By the introduction of
a third party, an outside interest, the strain on the individual is increased. For the
normal temptation has been heightened as the professional man's own interest,
hitherto exclusively personal, becomes weighted by the existence of the third party.
He may now consciously or subconsciously subordinate the client's interest even
where he would otherwise not have done so. His loyalty is divided.27 In this regard,
See, e.g., N. C. CODE (Michie, x939) c. 11o, art. I.
See, e.g., People ex rd. State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Pac. Health Corp., 12 Cal. (2d) x56, 158;
82 P. (2d) 429, 430, (1938); Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allisoh, 360 Ill. 638, 642, 196 N. E. 799, 800
(1935); Neill v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 330 Pa. 213, 219, 599 Ad. 179, 181 (1938).
26
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it is obvious that the objections to corporate practice are not overcome by pointing
to the legal and professional supervision over its licensed agents. 28 For these "external" safeguards do not operate within the sphere of individual motivation where
their sanctions are unenforceable.
To the problem of the effect of the corporate employment on the practitioner's
motivation must be added a second problem. It arises from the fact that corporate
organization necessarily implies delegation of functions. Even if usually strictly
medical functions, as surgery, etc., are left to licensed physicians, there is a penumbra
of activities usually reserved to the practitioner in independent practice but likely to
be delegated to lay personnel in a corporation. Certainly, a point may be reached
where this delegation is clearly undesirable. Where is the line to be drawn? Should
a lay board be delegated to impose general conditions on treatments to be rendered?
What, if the same function is entrusted to a board of physicians? Can the conclusion
of the agreement, fixing of fees, extension of credit thus be delegated? Obviously,
any delegation made to laymen will exempt conduct from the influence of medical
ethics as these rules apply to the physician's entire conduct whether technically
practice or not.
To seek a simple solution for both problems in an outright condemnation of medical services rendered within a corporate framework, as many dicta seem to indicate, 29
is, of course, possible. This position, however, would disregard substantial distinctions
in the types of interest presented in corporate form. Three types of corporations
might here be differentiated.
A. The first type would include those corporations where the interest of the
corporation is opposed to that of the patient only in a limited sense: any services to
him will necessarily reduce the amount of services available to the class of patients
which it serves. Here might be grouped: (a) charitable institutions of every description, (b) industrial organizations8" where a paternalistic entrepreneur has allotted a
budget for medical care of his employees; (c) incorporated fraternal and benefit organizations, (d) the recent group health organizations on a cooperative basis. 8 ' The
third interest presented by the corporate device in the last two instances may, in
disregard of the corporate entity, be considered as identical with that of the patient as
a member of the organized group.
B. In the second type of corporation the interest of the entity does not essentially
differ from that of the individual licensee. Its chief representativel " is "group practice"
carried on in the form of an incorporated clinic. The disregard of the corporate entity
would reveal, not the identity of patient and corporation, as in the previous illustration, but of physician and corporation. As long as the medical control is unimpaired,
all responsible officers are within the sphere of professional, i., ethical, motivation.
:8 Conta: Note (1938) 48

YALE

'See the numerous cases cited

L. J. 346, 348, 350.
102

A. L. R. 343 (936);

103 A. L. R. 1240 (1936); 119 A. L. R.

1290 (1939).

30Here, the rendition of medical services within a corporate framework is merely incidental to an
economic enterprise with a wholly different main purpose.
3'See Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. C. 1938).
2 Another is the "one-man corporation." For examples, see the last two cases cited in note 45, inlra.
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C. The third type comprises lay-controlled business corporations, admittedly organized for profit, insurance companies, etc. Here, plainly, any service rendered to
the patient may reduce the possible profit margin of the corporate enterprise, a
"third interest" which is alien to doctor and patient alike and which is characterized
by the need for profits and return of invested capital. This basic need of its corporate
life must condition all its relations and will tax greatly the motivating strength of the
ethical rules'even where there is complete absence of lay interference with medical
activity. Economic realities need no tangible medium to assert themselves.
It will be realized that this classification is only tentative.3 2 In reality, the lines
will often be blurred. The industrialist who makes profits8" on the contributions
exacted from his employees for medical care, the "medical group" operating with
high pressure business methods, are ready illustrations. Nonetheless, the attempted
classification is based on real distinctions which reflect varying degrees of strain on
the practitioner's motivation and of impairment of the doctor-patient relationship.
The problem remains whether these distinctions may offer standards for future judgments which will carefully discriminate between corporation and corporation.8 4
The legal approach to this question has been made in terms of "corporate practice." This phrase conceals faulty analysis in which, although the corporation's
inability to act physically is recognized, the acts of its agents are attributed to it. The
corporation is then treated as a human actor. Where the act is the practice of medicine, the corporation itself is said to practice and, being unlicensed, is held guilty of
violating the licensure acts.8 5 The flaw in this reasoning lies in its anthropomorphism. The law does not attribute the acts of a human being to that legal construct,
the corporation. Instead, it imputes the legal consequences of such acts to the corporation. If a corporate agent's act is wrongful, its legal consequence-the liability
prescribed for that wrong-will be imposed on the corporation, so far at least as the
" Nor is the classification the only .possible one: a distinction may be based on the absence or presence
of payment by the patient. The requirements placed on medical service will be strict where the patient
pays full or partial compensation, the recipient of charity will have to take what is tendered to him.
sCf. Texas and Pac. Coal Co. v. Connaughton, 2o Tex. Civ. App. 642, 50 S. W. 173 (1899); Owens
v. Ad. Coast Lumber Corp., io8 S. C. 528, 94 S. E. 15 (9,7).
"' The suggested classification has significance beyond the formal field of corporate organizations. The
types of "third interest" will recur with the same implications regardless of the organizational form.
Cf. Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S. C. 39, 198 S. E. 419 (1938) (partnership may not practice optometry). Cf.
also PRINCIPLES OF MEmc, Ermcs, supra note 2, c. 1, §2 (Groups and Clinics): "The ethical principles
actuating and governing a group or clinic are exactly the same as those applicable to the individual. As a
group or clinic is composed of individual doctors, each of whom, whether employer, employee or partner,
is subject to the principles of ethics, herein elaborated, the isniting into a business or professional organization does not relieve them either individually or as a group from the obligation they assume when entering
the profession."
"I Cf. Winslow v. Kansas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 223 Pac. 3o8 (1924).

"... that

a corporation cannot stand up on its hind legs before a board of bar examiners and recite the rule in
Shelley's case .. . is true, but meaningless.. ." Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-pecuniary Corporations: a Social Utility (r934) 2 UNIV. Cm. L. REv.

xg, 529.

In an alternative analysis it would be admitted that those corporations where the position of the
employed physician is relatively unimpaired, practice medicine but that they are n6t within the purview
of the licensure statutes or enjoy a privilege to practice without license provided their employees are

licensed.
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sanction is susceptible of application to a corporation. If the agent's act is rightful,
there is no liability consequent upon it to be imposed on the corporation. Instead, the
act may create a right or privilege, the benefit of which may, by imputation, be
enjoyed by the corporation.
Under this correct analysis, it will be seen that there is no occasion for the use of
the term "corporate practice." The problem becomes instead whether the practitioner
agents of a corporation furnishing medical services have engaged in unprofessional
conduct by assuming obligations which weaken ethical restraints or result' in improper delegations of responsibility to lay agents. This inquiry leads directly to an
examination of the purposes and organization of the corporation subject to attack. If,
as, for example, in most corporations of the first and second types, no conduct by
professional and lay agents which is improper in this sense is found, then there will
be no violation of the licensure acts to be imputed to the corporation. But where, as
in most commercialized enterprises, the set-up threatens professional safeguards,
violation of the licensure acts by the corporate agents may be found and imputed
to the corporation.
In turning to the decisions which seem to have denied categorically to corporations the right to practice medicine,"8 an observation should be made. Most of the
37
decided cases do not involve medicine proper, but relate to the practice of dentistry
and optometry3 s by corporations admittedly organized for profit, the third type in
the classification. Is it surprising to find the courts applying a broad rule without
nice distinctions, when they strike down these commercial ventures, especially where
the corporate cloak hides quackery? Thus, a dentist changing his first names from
Edgar Randolph to "Painless," and operating a complex network of "Painless Parker
System" corporations, has furnished a much quoted cluster of precedents3 0 Decisions
involving directly the right to practice medicine within a corporate framework are
relatively rare. Yet here, too, most of the decided cases present a rather uniform
pattern: profit organizations with the streak of quackery. Institutes for cancer treat3

Supra note 29.
"Dentistry is distinguishable from medicine by its narrow field,' rather uniform treatment, lesser
seriousness of the "disease." These factors, and the relatively recent discovery by the public of the importance of dental care for health generally may account for belated admission of dentistry to the "professional sanctum." With a professional ethos less strongly developed, reported excursions into commercial
fields are, accordingly, more frequent.
,s The same distinction may be made for optometry, an occupation to which some courts deny professional character. Consultation of an optometrist may be viewed as a necessary preliminary or annex to
a sales transaction. The commercial tinge is more pronounced and the reported cases revolve around a
rather uniform fact situation: independent optometrists versus the department store employing a licensed
optometrist or leasinj a department to another optometrical entrepreneur maintaining chains of such
leased departments.
"'Parker v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 291 Pac. 421 (Cal. App. 1930); Parker v. Bd. of Dental
Examiners i P. (2d) 5o (Cal. App. 193); Parker v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d)
67 (1932); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (1929); People ex rel.
Mahurin
v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 85 Colo. 321, 275 Pac. 933 (1929); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.
Savelle, 90 Colo. i77, 8 P. (2d) 693 (1932); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Miller, go Colo. 193, 8
P. (2d) 699 (932); see "Painless Parrmer, Inc." in Rust v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 127,
256 N. 'V. 99 (x934).
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ment with secret fluids and powders°40 for liquor habits, 41 organizations where the
treatment is part of a sales scheme for pharmaceutical products 42 are eliminated by
judicial veto.
The second and first types of corporations present a different picture. The first is
notably absent: no reported cases have been found where courts have directly prevented corporate practice by charitable or educational institutions, industry or railroads. On the contrary, occasional dicta evidence judicial tolerance.43 The latest
arrival in this group, the non-profit cooperative patient or "consumer" organizations,
has received explicit judicial sanction so far in one case, recently decided in Washington, D. C.44 No cases have been found directly4 5 challenging the second group:
corporations formed by physicians practicing in groups. This is not surprising as
the policy arguments against them are less weighty. It may be assumed that they will
acquire a similar "prescriptive right to exist" as has been accorded the various
charitable and paternalistic organizations enumerated under the first group.
As the new forms of practice spread, the courts will have further occasion to reconsider the broad maxim condemning all corporations alike. It served satisfactorily
in the past when it was exclusively invoked against anti-social activities, but its sweep
becomes oppressive today as it threatens desirable experimentation. Until the legislatures have spoken explicitly, it is important that the courts exercise a nice discrimination in dealing with new forms of corporate organization in the medical field.
"State v. Baker, 212 Iowa 571, 235 N. W. 313 (93x); State v. Baker, 222 Iowa 903, 270 N. W. 359
(1936).
"'Godfrey v. Medical Society of N. Y. County, 177 App. Div. 684, z64 N. Y. Supp: 846 (1917).
"People ex tel. Lederman v. Warden, x68 App. Div. 240, 152 N. Y. Supp. 977 (1915); State v.
Heffernan, 28 R. I. 2o, 65 Ad. 284 (19o6).
" See People ex rel. State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. (2d), 156, 157, 82
P. (2d) 429, 43X (1938); People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E.
697 (1908); Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co. of N. Y., 7 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 242, 248 (1938).
Malpractice suits against industrial corporations or railroads have been denied by classifying the employed
physician as an "independent contractor." The restriction of corporate liability to cases where the employing corporation acted negligently in selecting the physician is, in effect, a judicial encouragement of this
form of practice. See Note, Liability of Hospital for Injuries to Patients using Hospital Facilities (938)
48 YALE L. J. 81, 90; Metzger v. Western Ry., 30 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1929); Pearl v. West End
Street Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (1900).
"Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, supra note 3.
Cs
f.Iterman v. Baker, 15 N. E. (2d) 365 (Ind. 1938); Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W.
(2d) x65 (938); Daly's Astoria Sanatorium v. Blair, 161 Misc. 76, 291 N. Y. Supp. xoo6 (936);
Tarry v. Johnston, 114 Neb. 496, 2o8 N. W. 615 (1926). Cf. also State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, x8 Mo.
App. 149, xo6 S. W. 581 (907) for judicial toleration of a "Hernia Cure Co" under professional control;
Chenoweth v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 57 Coo. 74, 141 Pac. 132 (1913).

